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1. Introduction  
One  cannot  understand  the  formulation,  application  and  impact  of  environmental 
policy in Brazil today without explicitly considering public prosecutors as one of the key 
players, directly and indirectly responsible for a large part of the incentives and constraints 
faced by other actors such as businesses, government agencies and social movements. In the 
years  since  the  passage  of  the  Brazilian  Constitution  of  1988,  public  prosecutors  have 
evolved from their traditional role of merely prosecuting those who commit crimes, into 
political actors that play a much wider role in several policy areas, including a central role in 
environmental policy (McAllister 2008a). 
Although  the  evolution  of  the  Ministério  Público  in  the  past  decades  has  been 
remarkable,  it  is  by  no  means  an  isolated  event.  Political  institutions  in  Brazil  have 
undergone an intense process of change since the 1980s with the evolution of the public 
prosecutors merely a part of that overall movement (Alston, Melo, Mueller and Pereira, 
2008). Inflation, once endemic, came under control; the external debt was settled; democracy 
was consolidated with real alternation of power; governors lost much their influence at the 
federal level (Melo 2002); political parties became more disciplined and institutionalized 
(Amorim Neto 2002); and wealth concentration started reverting after 500 years resisting all 
attempts at redistribution (Barros et al. 2006).   
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  explain  how  public  prosecutors  affect  the 
environmental policy process and to use available data to provide support for the claim that 
their impact on environmental policy is positive. The basic argument is as follows. The main 
characteristic of the general policymaking process is the dominance of a fiscal imperative 
that leads the President to use his/her substantial powers to pursue monetary stability and 
fiscal responsibility (Alston, Melo, Mueller and Pereira 2008). The fiscal imperative means 
that all other policy areas, including environmental policy, will only be attended to if the 
macroeconomic  constraint  permits.  However,  the  significant  involvement  of  public 
prosecutors works as a countervailing constraint that impedes the President from simply 
pushing environmental policy to the sidelines. An analysis of available data suggests that 
their involvement in environmental policy leads to welfare gains for society.   
The  second  section  of  the  paper  introduces  the  Brazilian  prosecutors,  with  a 
description of the powers, preferences, motivations, and modus operandi. The section that 
follows  describes  the  general  characteristics  of  environmental  policy,  showing  that  it  is 
highly institutionalized and visible yet has often been uncoordinated, volatile and ineffective. 
The fourth section presents the heart of the argument, showing how environmental policy in 
Brazil  involves  a  clash  between  independent,  resourceful  and  zealous  prosecutors  and  a 
preponderant  federal  Executive  in  the  shadow  of  electoral  sympathy  for  environmental 
issues, and setting forth the characteristics of the policymaking game which ensues. The fifth 
section presents a model of the prosecutors’ role as enforcers of environmental policy which 
is followed by a section that presents a quantitative analysis designed to determine whether 
the role of public prosecutors in environmental policy actually leads to welfare gains for 
society or whether they simply distort policy implementation or even aggravate the situations 
they address. 
 
2. The History, Structure, Preferences, Motivation, Resources and Instruments of 
Public Prosecutors in Brazil 
The fundamental role of public prosecutors in determining the form and impact of 
environmental policy (as well as many other policy areas) is a relatively recent development, 
dating from legal and political changes in the 1980s (McAllister 2005, 2008a; Arantes 1999, 
2004;  Sadek  1997;  Sadek  and  Lima  2006).    Although  most  countries  have  public 2 
 
prosecutors, in Brazil they play a particularly important role in shaping public policy. The 
country’s political institutions give the prosecutors the independence, the legal instruments 
and the resources, which allow them to be an extremely active watchdog of the actions of the 
other political actors (McAllister 2008a: 121-22).  This section describes the characteristics 
of the public prosecutors in Brazil, with a focus on how their structure, preferences, powers 
and instruments enable them to have an impact on environmental policies.  
The Ministério Público (MP) has existed in Brazil since 1609 (Macedo Jr. 1999), 
however  its  role  and  institutional  organization  has  changed  over  time  as  different 
Constitutions have redefined its structure. As in most countries, one of its purposes is to 
prosecute, in the name of the State, those who commit crimes. However, in Brazil the MP 
has taken on an additional role that has lead it to turn much of its attention to the process of 
public policy making. These changes began in 1985 when a legal instrument known as the 
“public civil action” (ação civil pública) was created, through which the MP could take to 
court any person or entity for harm done to the environment, consumer rights, or the artistic, 
cultural, historical, tourist and landscape patrimony of the nation.
1  The 1988 Constitution 
amplified the scope of the public civil action by stating that it is the institutional role of the 
Ministério Público to “promote civil investigations and public civil actions for the protection 
of  public  and  social  patrimony,  of  the  environment  and  of  other  diffuse  and  collective 
interests.”
2 This apparently innocuous article has enabled the MP to take into its jurisdiction 
the monitoring of all public policy, for practically any act of public policy making can be 
construed to affect “diffuse and collective interests.”
3  The effect was to bring to the judicial 
arena  a series  of  social  conflicts  that  previously  would  have  been  mediated  only  in  the 
political arena (Arantes 1999: 83; McAlister 2008a: 172-76).   
Simply establishing a new role for the public prosecutors in the Constitution would 
be innocuous were it not accompanied by other provisions that granted them the conditions 
necessary to carry out that role. The Constitution did in fact provide those conditions, in 
terms of independence, resources and legal instruments. Whereas before the Constitution the 
MP was part of the Executive power, the new charter made the MP autonomous, not only in 
terms of insulation from interference by the other powers but also in term of budgets, which 
are fixed and automatic (McAllister 2005, 2008a). The Executive’s only prerogative is to 
choose the head of the federal MP from one of its members at the start of the term, being 
immovable thereafter. This independence extends to the level of the individual prosecutors. 
The  entrance  into  the  career  is  by  public  exam  open  to  all  citizens  with  the  necessary 
qualifications, though exams are difficult and vacancies often remain unfilled. The 1988 
Constitution establishes that prosecutors cannot be fired, transferred nor have their salaries 
reduced. In addition each prosecutor is independent within the profession, being immune 
from internal pressure as in effect there is only administrative and not functional hierarchy 
(Arantes 1999:90). Salaries are among the highest in the country for public sector jobs and as 
a consequence they attract highly competent people (McAllister 2008a: 76-78). 
  In addition to resources, the MP possesses a set of powerful legal and judicial instruments. 
The first of these is the “conduct adjustment agreement,” through which they can request that 
an  individual,  firm  or  governmental  entity  cease  or  change  a  certain  behavior  or  be 
prosecuted (McAllister 2008a: 91-92). In practice this instrument has been a credible threat 
as it can impose significant costs even if the case is struck down in court.  The MP also has 
the authority to open a “civil investigation,” under which prosecutors can request free expert 
                                                              
1 Public civil actions can be initiated by states, municipalities, public companies and even civil society. 
However in practice it is mostly the MP that takes the initiative. Other entities have preferred to invoke 
the MP rather than do so themselves. See McAllister 2008a: 152-53 (explaining that environmental 
groups bring their complaints to the MP and stating that about 97% of environmental public civil actions 
have been filed by prosecutors). 
2 1988 Constitution art. 129-III. 
3 On the meaning of the terms diffuse and collective interests, see McAllister 2008a: 199-200 (n.5).  3 
 
advice from police and other governmental organizations such as environmental agencies 
(McAllister 2008a: 90-91). And most importantly, they can file a civil public action to take 
to  court  those  who  harm  collective  and  diffuse  interests.  In  practice  this  has  proven  a 
tremendously effective instrument as the prosecutors are highly trained and know how to use 
the often tortuous Brazilian judicial system. Even though judges have the final word and 
may rule against the MP, many of those being prosecuted find it better to negotiate.  It is 
estimated that about 90% of such suits are settled (McAllister 2008a: 99-100; Sadek 2000: 
28)   
Generous endowments of human and financial resources as well as an effective set of 
instruments are not enough to explain the new role taken by the MP. There remains the issue 
of motivation, that is, what this largely independent organization chooses to do with these 
endowments.  With the Constitution of 1988, the MP was no longer charged with being the 
Executive’s advocate, that is, defending the Executive’s interest before the judiciary. This 
role was ascribed to a new governmental entity (the Union’s General Advocacy) leaving the 
MP unencumbered to be the advocate of society, defending “diffuse and collective interests,” 
prominently among which is environmental policy. Interestingly what evolved was a very 
particular pattern of preferences and motivations in the (mostly young) prosecutors, where 
they  see  themselves  as  playing  a  messianic  role  in  society:  defending  the  weak  and 
defenseless (Arantes 2002). Importantly for the theme of this paper, they see a large part of 
their role as defending society from government, who they see as being responsible, by 
omission and by commission, of many violations against diffuse and collective interests. For 
example, rather than simply prosecuting a polluter, they will prosecute the environmental 
agency for allowing the pollution to occur (McAllister 2008a: 123-27).  
The  reasons  for  this  zealotry  are  difficult  to  ascertain.  It  may  be  due  to  a  self-
selection process where individuals with that view of the world are more attracted to a job 
where they can “make a difference”, or it may be induced by an esprit de corps that induces 
most members to adopt a common vision (McAllister 2008: 81-83). A survey by Arantes 
(1999)  with  763  members  of  the  Ministério  Público  shows  that  they see the  social  and 
political performance of the Executive and Legislature, at all levels and political parties as 
very  poor.  In  addition  they  see  themselves  as  the  most  important  institution  to  defend, 
broaden and consolidate social rights. 
A couple examples illustrate the pervasive influence of prosecutors in environmental 
policy and their modus operandi. This author first became aware the importance of the MP 
when participating as a consultant in a World Bank mission in 2001 that travelled to various 
parts of the country to study the role of property rights on the use of natural resources such 
as land, forests and water. The itinerary included visits to and interviews with a wide array of 
organizations and actors that competed for these resources or in some way affected how they 
were  used.  The list was meant to  be comprehensive, including  large and  small  farmers, 
squatters,  loggers,  landless  peasants,  politicians,  mayors,  governor’s  office,  state  and 
municipal  environmental  agencies  or  secretariats,  land  reform  agencies,  water  basin 
committees,  judges,  police,  academic  specialists,  NGOs,  and  community  groups,  among 
others. No consideration was given to public prosecutors as these had not seemed at the 
planning of the mission to have any link to the issue being studied. However, as one visit 
succeeded the next it soon became apparent that this was a serious omission. In interview 
after  interview  the  narrative  would  include  and  frequently  center  on  the  role  of  public 
prosecutors.  These  surfaced  not  only  in  their  more  traditional  capacity  --  monitoring, 
enforcing and taking to court those that break the law -- but also in a surprisingly diverse set 
of other roles, such as coordinating collective action, brokering negotiations, acting as notary 
public for promises by other actors to do or refrain from doing given actions, and educating 
and providing information.  4 
 
More  recently,  perhaps  nowhere  more  than  in  the  permitting  processes  of  new 
hydroelectric  dams  has  the  role  of  public  prosecutors  been  evident.    Over  85%  of  the 
country’s  electricity  is  hydroelectric,  and  new  dams  are  crucial  to  avoid  an  electricity 
shortage as was experienced in 2001. Accordingly President Lula’s second term flagship 
program  known  as  PAC  (Program  for  Growth  Acceleration)  has  more  than  half  of  its 
intended  investment  of  R$503.9  billion  dedicated  to  energy  related  projects.  The 
administration of this program was entrusted to Dilma Rouseff, the President’s all-powerful 
cabinet chief and candidate for the 2010 presidential election. Despite all the political will 
dedicated to the PAC, it became clear from the outset that the large list of projects would not 
be easy to implement. Half way through the President’s term more than 60% of the projects 
are greatly behind schedule (Estado de São Paulo, 02/01/2009).  
One of the greatest obstacles has been the requirement of environmental permitting, 
given that infrastructure projects such as dams, ports and roads typically have large impacts 
on the environment. World Bank (2008) analyzes the problems involved in environmental 
permitting for hydroelectric projects in Brazil and finds that the costs imposed range from 
15% to 19% of the cost of each installed megawatt, including the direct and the opportunity 
costs. The main problem is not only the length of time it takes to get all three required 
permits – 6.5 years on average – but more so the high dispersion of time among all cases, 
which raises the uncertainty and makes it harder to plan and finance the projects. One of the 
main sources  of this  state of affairs, according to the report, is the  unpredictability that 
derives from the involvement of the public prosecutors: 
Public prosecutors enjoy virtually unlimited autonomy in Brazil. This power has no parallel in any of 
the other countries examined in this study and plays an important role in the lack of predictability 
and timeliness of the environmental licensing process. This allows prosecutors to be involved in 
technical or administrative acts related to the environment, which would otherwise fall under the 
mandate of the environmental agency. (World Bank 2008: 10) 
This impact of the public prosecutors comes not only from instances when they 
directly challenge a proposed or initiated project, but also by prosecuting the members of the 
state  and  federal  environmental  agencies  in  charge  of  reviewing  and  deciding  on  the 
requested permits. According to the World Bank report the propensity of the prosecutors to 
charge them under the Law of Environmental Crimes for administrative improbity has lead 
the staff of the licensing organizations to become highly conservative with the concession of 
licenses, thus adding to the delay and to the uncertainty (World Bank 2008).
4 In 2008, for 
example, the federal MP warned the president and directors of IBAMA (the federal EPA) 
that it would take them to court using that law if they insisted in conceding the license for the 
construction of a dam in the Madeira river in the Amazon (Valor Econômico, 10/28/2008). 
In the same month President Lula complained in a speech that today in Brazil a civil servant 
“counts a thousand times to ten” before signing any authorization due to fear of the MP’s 
reaction (O Estado de São Paulo, 10/22/2008). 
 
3. Political Institutions and Environmental Policy in Brazil 
  The involvement of public prosecutors in environmental policy occurs within a setting of 
widespread mismanagement of the environment in Brazil that has often resulted in 
economically inefficient, socially inequitable and environmentally devastating outcomes. 
Pollution and deforestation rates have been high and are following an increasing trend, 
notwithstanding the deceptive respite of occasional yearly declines. Property rights to natural 
resources are ill-defined and insecure, leading to both lack of investment and premature 
investment (Alston, Libecap and Mueller 1999). The scramble to appropriate these resources 
involves massive invasion of public and private property. Laws and regulations are 
unremittingly and blatantly disrespected. Forest reserve requirements (80% in the Amazon) 
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are rarely observed and even conservation units and indigenous reserves are systematically 
plundered (McAllister 2008c: 10876-77). Economic activity in the form of agriculture, 
ranching, mining, fishing and extraction is often wasteful, destructive and unsustainable, 
resulting in pollution, erosion, extinction, conflict and violence. Programs, policies and 
regulation that purport to address these issues are frequently innocuous and many times 
provide incentives that either exacerbate the problem or lead to other unexpected perverse 
outcomes. This often occurs due to lack of resources, but in many cases due to incompetence 
and in others due to malfeasance and corruption. 
It is not the absence of interest on the part of the government or society that has 
allowed  this  alarming  state  of  affairs  to  arise  and  to  persist.  The  environment  features 
prominently in governmental policy and discourse. These in turn reflect the interests of the 
electorate that demands attention to these issues, which have consequently been hoisted to 
cabinet level with the creation of a Ministry of the Environment (1992) and a Ministry of 
Agrarian Development (2000). In addition both areas count with large executing agencies; 
IBAMA (Brazilian Institute for the Environment) and INCRA (National Institute for Land 
Reform)  as  well  as  a  host  of  other  secretariats  and  departments  at  different  levels  of 
government. All of these organizations are active in their fields and constantly pursue new 
programs, policies and actions. In addition, they are constantly seeking to improve and are 
open to new technologies and training of their staff.
5. 
Neither is it the case that the problems identified above can be attributed to a lack of 
legislation. It is generally agreed that Brazilian law contains a body of legislation specific to 
the issues of land and the environment that provides a good legal basis and the instruments 
needed  to  actually  address  those  problems  (Cavalcanti  2004;  McAllister  2008a).  This 
legislation includes several direct references to these issues in the Constitution (1988), the 
Land Statute (1964), the Law of Environmental Crimes (1998), the Forest Code (1965), as 
well  as  a  host  of  related  complementary  laws  and  regulations  that  have  improved  and 
updated  these  legal  documents.  In  addition,  based  on  past  experience  and  the  political 
support  for  these  kinds  of  issues,  it  is  probably  the  case  that  new  legislation  will  be 
forthcoming as it is needed. 
The  current  state  of  the  environment  described  above  is  also  not  due  to  lack  of 
interest from society or to lack of organization or opportunity to voice its opinion and to 
participate in the formulation of policy. Although the Brazilian population is more than 81% 
urban and less than 11% live in the Amazon region, environmental issues in general and 
those  related  to  the  Amazon  in  specific feature  prominently  in  the  collective  conscious. 
There is a large, diverse and vibrant third sector composed of civil society organizations and 
social movements which participate in numerous fora at all levels of government (Hall 1997; 
Hochstetler  and  Keck  2007).  There  is  a  long  tradition  in  Brazil  of  the  participation  of 
councils in policymaking, such as the CONAMA (National Council for the Environment) 
and a host of local councils which deal with issues from environment to education to the 
regulation of water basins.
 These councils provide access for groups, such as NGOs, to truly 
have  a  say  over  policy  (Ascerlad  1996;  Banco  Interamericano  de 
Desenvolvimento/Ministério do Meio Ambiente 2002.). The environment is the issue which 
has generated the largest number of NGOs in Brazil (IBGE 2008). In addition the press is 
independent and vocal on issues related to the environment. 
An apparent puzzle emerges from the picture presented above. How can the sorry 
state of environmental resource use described in the first paragraph of this section have 
emerged and persisted in the rosy social, political and legal environment described in the 
following three? The characteristics of environmental resources may be partly accountable 
for the poor outcomes, as they tend to be large, distant, obscure, inhospitable, amorphous, 
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of deforestation from INPE (National Institute for Space Research). 6 
 
ever-changing, etc, which creates impediments for the timely collection of information and 
implementation  and  enforcement  of  policies.  Nevertheless,  the  magnitude  of  social  and 
economic waste is so large that there should be great incentives for reform so as to capture 
currently dissipated rents. The standard answer to this puzzle is that it is in fact no puzzle at 
all.  Government discourse is merely lip-service and is not matched by effective action. 
Ministries may have been created but they are under-funded and are not given real power. 
Programs and policies are just for show. Just enough is done to convince the electorate, the 
press and the international community that the intention is there and that change is under 
way, but not enough is done to actually achieve that change. Similarly the legislation may be 
well-meaning and legally sound, but it is useless as it is rarely applied and does not reach the 
places where it is most needed. As for civil society, NGOs and social movements, they are 
given a voice but that voice is rarely heard. The participation in policy making through 
councils and other forums merely serves to appease these groups and diffuse their criticism.  
This assessment of the true nature of environmental policymaking in Brazil may be 
correct in many points, but it is too vague to be meaningful or useful. What is needed is an 
understanding of why this is the way things take place, that is, an understanding of the 
determinant of the choices that have led to this state of affairs. It is not enough, for example, 
to state that pollution and deforestation continue to grow because environmental regulators 
are not allocated enough resources.
6 The reason that those resources are not available is a 
direct consequence of political decisions made within the policymaking process. The next 
section describes the relevant dynamics of the policymaking process and shows how public 
prosecutors affect these dynamics. 
 
4. Brazilian Political Institutions and Policymaking Process  
The main characteristic of the general policymaking process is the dominance of a 
fiscal  imperative  that  leads  the  President  to  use  his/her  substantial  powers  to  pursue 
monetary  stability  and  fiscal  responsibility.
7    The  fiscal  imperative  means  that  all  other 
policy  areas  will  only  be  attended  to  if  the  macroeconomic  constraint  permits.  The 
environment is the quintessential residual policy area, where the first cuts will be sought 
when the fiscal constraint becomes  binding, as it has  been at  varying  levels in  the  past 
decades.  However,  there  are  countervailing  constraints  that  impede  the  President  from 
simply pushing environmental policy to the sidelines. 
4.1. Four Categories of Policies 
The  most  salient  feature  of  Brazilian  political  institutions  is  the  strength  of  the 
President. This strength is based on a series of instruments, rights and prerogatives that in 
essence allow the Executive to closely control the political agenda and to a great extent 
achieve  his/her  policy  preferences.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  Executive’s  powers  are 
unchecked, as several other actors, such as Congress, the Judiciary and Public Prosecutors 
have  constitutionally  defined  powers  to  constrain  the  President’s  actions  in  specific 
situations.  Four  categories  of  policy  outcomes  emerge  from  this  interaction.  The  first 
consists  of  macroeconomic  policies,  such  as  fiscal  and  monetary  policies,  with  a  direct 
impact on stabilization and economic growth. These goals are given priority above all other 
issues and are thus known as the ‘fiscal imperative.’ The President, independent of personal 
ideological  preferences,  has  electoral  incentives  to  pursue  these  policies  in  an  orthodox 
manner  as  he/she  is  seen  by  voters  as  responsible  for  outcomes  in  this  area  and  is 
accordingly rewarded or punished. Similarly, global financial markets are quick to punish 
any  deviant  behavior  in  this  area  affecting  exchange  rates,  country  risk  and  investment 
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kilometers and yet the federal environmental agency has less than 300 inspectors for the region. 
7 This section is based on Alston, Melo, Mueller and Pereira (2008). 7 
 
flows.
8 Whereas the electoral connection and financial markets assure that the President will 
want to prioritize stable and adaptable macro policies, strong presidential powers assure that 
he/she has the ability to do so. 
The second category involves policies used by the President to provide patronage to 
other political actors in exchange for support in approving his/her agenda of reforms, that is, 
geographically concentrated transfers, or “pork.” Political institutions in Brazil provide the 
President  with  several  political  ‘currencies’,  such  as  jobs  in  the  federal  structure  and 
budgetary transfers that can be used to ‘purchase’ support, especially within Congress, thus 
providing high levels of governability at low cost. Although there are undesirable aspects to 
this form of policymaking, there are also advantages of having effective means of realizing 
political  transactions  in  a  country  with  such  dire  need  for  reforms  (Alston  and  Mueller 
2006). 
The  third  category  includes  policies  that  are  hard-wired  at  some  ‘constitutional 
moment’ and cannot be easily changed. These are policies such as social security, education 
and health that typically have strong externalities for society but whose beneficial effects 
only mature in the long term so that politicians might be tempted to trade them off for 
policies with more immediate political returns, which is what motivated insulating them in 
this  way.  Most  of this  insulation was done during  the  writing  of the 1988 Constitution. 
Despite the President’s strong institutional powers the hardwiring is binding, forcing the 
government to finance these through extreme levels of taxation, high levels of borrowing and 
by holding off on non-hardwired expenditures, which are the final category of policies. 
The final category consists of residual policies, which are only given priority when 
the objectives of the first category of policies (the fiscal imperative) have been secured. 
These are policies that, similarly to the previous category, can be postponed with relatively 
few short term costs to the government, but over which no agreement for hardwiring was 
achieved. They also include policies that the government can credibly yet deceptively claim 
to  be  pursuing  without  actually  having  to  detract  resources  from  the  first  category  of 
policies. Policies related to the environment, infrastructure, poverty, land reform, etc. are in 
this  category.  Note  that  they  are  frequently  policies  that  have  a  strong  ideological 
component. As a result of these characteristics these policies have a tendency to be volatile, 
oscillating according to political shocks, such as when a new president comes to office. 
Summarizing, in Brazil one will observe stable and adaptive macro policies that are 
achieved through the exchange of pork for support between the Executive and Congress, 
with some policies hardwired beyond the political actors’ reach, and the remaining set of 
policies dependant on budgetary conditions and fluctuating in content according to political 
and economic shocks. Having described the dependent variable, that is, the characteristics of 
policies in Brazil, the remainder of this section describes the political institutions and the 
policymaking game that produce these outcomes. 
 
4.2. The Pursuit of Stable Macroeconomic Policies and its Consequences 
The claim thus far has been that the President faces strong incentives to pursue 
stable and adjustable macro policies, and that he/she possesses strong powers with which to 
do so. Evidence of the first claim is the surprising adherence by the Lula government to 
orthodox fiscal and monetary policy when he and his party had always forcibly combated 
exactly this line of policy. Evidence of the second has been the high rate of presidential 
success in the past two decades. The purpose now is to provide more detail on how this state 
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reputation are much more important than in most other Latin American countries where the cost of 
alarming foreign investors is smaller.  8 
 
of affairs affects the policies that emerge and their characteristics.
9 Much of the pursuit of 
stable macro policies takes place through amendments to the constitution in areas such as 
administrative  reform,  social  security  reform,  tax  reform,  etc,  that  have  important 
implications for current and future macroeconomic variable. It is this pattern, where the 
President  pursues  fundamental  reforms  in  a  responsible  manner  that  has  dominated  the 
agenda in Congress since the mid 1990s. 
Simultaneous to the reform agenda, the day to day running of government policy is 
administered  by  the  Executive  similarly  subject  to  the  overriding  goal  of  stable 
macroeconomic variables. This implies tight fiscal policies that are achieved through very 
careful attention to the level of internal debt and the high primary surplus targets. This has 
important consequence for all policy areas, including environmental policies, as resources 
allocated by the budget remain contingent on those targets being met. The Executive has 
great discretion whether or not to execute expenditures contained in the budget so as to 
assure  the  primary  surplus  and  consequently  the  intended  debt/GDP  ratio.  The  main 
instrument used to suspend expenditures is known as contingenciamento, as they remain 
contingent  on  those  targets  being  achieved.  At  the  beginning  of  each  fiscal  year  the 
government passes a decree impounding part of the discretionary expenditures in the budget, 
that  is,  those  that  are  not  hard-wired.  As  the  year  proceeds,  these  resources  can  be 
“unimpounded” if tax receipts are greater than expected and if hard-wired expenditures have 
not been greater than expected. These impoundments are used across the board affecting 
every governmental expenditure in every ministry, department, agency, secretariat, etc, in all 
three  branches  and  all  levels  of  government.  However,  some  expenditures  are  more 
vulnerable than others, which results in the pattern of volatile residual policies described 
above. These are areas, such as environment, poverty reduction, land reform, and especially 
infrastructure, which will tend to have their resources squeezed first and foremost when the 
primary surplus targets have not yet been reached. Thus, since 1999 when Brazil started the 
current trend of high primary surpluses in response to a massive devaluation of the Real, 
these types of policies have suffered significantly.  
Achieving the required primary surpluses involves denying resources and transfers 
to great number of groups in society as it involves cutting expenditures which were already 
approved in the budgetary process and to which those groups consequently feel entitled to. 
The surpluses achieved since 1999 have been reached at the expense of a series of programs 
and policies which have to bear the brunt of the sacrifice, given that hardwired expenditures 
cannot be used for this purpose and that macro policy is foremost in the President’s agenda. 
This explains why issues such as poverty alleviation and land reform, which have always 
been flagship  issues  of the  Labor  Party  and  had  figured  prominently  in  the  presidential 
campaign of 2002, were great disappointments. It also explains why a series of areas have 
been largely neglected in this period, such as investment in roads, public administration and 
universities. Understanding that environmental policy has been one of the major areas where 
the adjustment to the fiscal imperative has taken place allows us to go further than simply 
claiming that the poor results in this issue area are due to lack of resources or political will 
and to understand the underlying determinants of this situation. Note also that an implication 
of this analysis is that, as the country’s macroeconomic situation improves, with increased 
GDP and lower interest rates, primary surplus targets will come down relaxing the fiscal 
imperative and expenditures in these residual policies may be increased, although they still 
remain volatile as they are subject to political shocks. 
 
4.3. Constraints on the Fiscal Imperative 
                                                              
9 The central role of the fiscal imperative in the government’s motivations is explored in greater detail in 
Alston, Melo, Pereira and Mueller (2008) together with more detailed evidence of its pervasiveness. 9 
 
If the fiscal imperative were the only determinant of the nature of environmental 
policy, then it would probably be the case that very little would even get initiated, as happens 
with several issues areas which simply do not emerge in the political debate. However, the 
environment  has  two  forces  which  constrain  the  government’s  ability  to  refrain  from 
dedicating effort and resources in that area.
  
The first is a strong preference by the electorate for policies aimed at protecting the 
environment.
 Alston and Mueller (2008) show that environmental interests have considerable 
political weight for the President, which implies that the prioritization of the macroeconomic 
variables cannot be achieved by simply postponing or putting the environmental policies on 
hold. Instead, the President must set up an entire bureaucratic structure so as to appease the 
political  demand  for  environmental  policy.  This  includes;  a  ministry  with  a  carefully 
appointed minister with authentic green credentials; an environmental protection agency, 
special secretariats, councils and departments; high visibility programs and initiatives for 
each  specific  area  (pollution,  water,  deforestation,  etc);  all  sorts  of  general  and  specific 
legislation; and a constant place in the government’s discourse. This structure is not simply a 
veneer and even the President’s intentions to actually follow through with the promises for 
the environment are not entirely cynical. At the time of creation there might even be the plan 
to actually follow through. However, actual funding of these policies remains contingent on 
the  fiscal  imperative.  When  the  macroeconomic  variables  constrain,  nothing  gets  done. 
When they are less constraining resources will flow and some form of environmental policy 
will materialize. However, if the constraint becomes binding again, the flow dries up and 
policies are put on hold. Given the cyclical nature of macroeconomic constraints in Brazil in 
the recent past, this has implied high volatility of policies. 
While the electorate is aware that the government may not be doing enough for the 
environment,  information  asymmetries  do  not  allow  them  to  ascertain  the  extent  of  the 
shirking. The slow rate at which environmental policy yields results implies a high level of 
information asymmetry by the electorate on what the government is actually doing and how 
effective those policies really are. As a consequence there is an incentive for the President to 
set up the scaffolding of environmental policy but to withhold the necessary financing for the 
policies to be effective. This appeases, to an extent, the demand for environmental policies 
without  detracting  much  from  the  more  pressing  need  to  maintain  a  favorable 
macroeconomic  environment.  Manifestations  of  this  strategy  are  apparent  wherever  the 
impacts of environmental policies are evaluated. The annual report of the Ministry of the 
Environment for any given year is a good example. These reports detail a long list of worthy 
programs  dealing  with  issues  such  as  biodiversity,  pollution,  sustainable  development, 
forest-fire prevention, environmental education, ecological zoning, protection of rivers, etc.
10 
Each program has a catchy name, a well devised strategy, an implementing bureaucracy and 
the funds budgeted in the budget law. Nevertheless, the description of what was actually 
accomplished during the year is more often than not a litany of excuses (correctly) ascribing 
to budgetary cuts (contingenciamentos) the fact that little was effectively achieved.  
The second constraint faced by the government when deciding on how much effort 
and resources to dedicate de facto to environmental policies are the public prosecutors. As 
shown in Section 1, public prosecutors take it to be one of their primary missions to defend 
‘diffuse  and  collective’  interest,  of  which  the  environment  is  a  primary  area  of  focus. 
Prosecutors are well endowed with human and financial resources, and have at their disposal 
potent legal instruments. Furthermore, their main line of action is not so much to target those 
that degrade the environment directly, but rather to prosecute the governmental agencies 
which should be monitoring and imposing the law. Thus the prosecutors clash directly with 
the government’s natural strategy to setup the makings of an environmental policy but to 
only follow through contingent on the fiscal imperative. In the next section I test whether 
                                                              
10 For an example see http://www.abrasil.gov.br/avalppa/site/content/av_prog/orgao/18/orgao18.htm . 10 
 
these actions of the prosecutors result is an equilibrium where a higher degree of effort by 
the government gets channeled to environmental policy than would otherwise be the case. 
There is a constant tension between the government’s natural electoral incentive to shirk on 
those policies and the constant vigilance and pestering of the public prosecutors. This does 
not mean that the environmental policy that emerges is ideal or even effective. In fact, the 
way in which public prosecutor’s operate is highly uncoordinated and piecemeal (McAllister 
2008a: 115-19, 162-64) with the result that although they have a large impact on the specific 
cases they address, the overall effect gets diluted and has a smaller impact on environmental 
outcomes than would otherwise be the case  
 
5. A Model of Environmental Regulation Enforcement 
In  order  to  model  the  impact  of  public  prosecutors  on  environmental policy  this 
section considers the interaction of a polluter, a regulator which enforces environmental laws 
and a third party which enforces the enforcement of the regulator. The term ‘regulator’ is 
used broadly to refer to any actor that takes actions to enforce environmental laws, such as 
an environmental protection agency, another governmental agency, the Ministério Público, 
an NGO or private enforcers. In a first step the model considers only the interaction of the 
polluter and the regulator to  determine the optimal amount of  effort  by the regulator  in 
enforcing environmental laws and consequently the equilibrium amount of pollution. The 
second step will be to consider the role of a third party which takes action to compel the 
regulator to be more effective in enforcing the laws. Comparative static results will show 
which  characteristics  make  an  actor  more  effective  as  a  regulator  and  an  enforcer  of 
enforcement.  These  results  can  then  be  used  to  compare  the  characteristics  of  actual 
enforcers  of  environmental  laws  (environmental  agency,  public  prosecutors  or  private 
enforcers)  to  determine which  of  these  has  the  greater  potential to  affect  environmental 
outcomes. 
5.1. The Polluter’s Problem 
The polluter is an economic agent that produces a negative externality that is directly 
associated with costs and benefits in production or consumption. Because there is a direct 
link of the pollution with those costs and benefits, we can express the polluter’s problem as a 
choice of the optimal amount of pollution, x: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) π ϕ x f x C x B
P
x − − max        (1) 
where B(x) is the total benefit to the polluter from x units of pollution (which corresponds to 
benefits from production or consumption), C
P(x) is the private cost of polluting, f(x) the fine 
associated with x units of pollution and φ(π) is the perceived probability that the fine will be 
levied and actually have to be paid.
11 This probability is affected by π, which measures 
actions  taken  by  the  regulator  to  enforce  the  environmental  laws.
12  The  efforts  of  the 
regulator will initially be taken as exogenous but will subsequently be determined by the 
regulator’s maximization below. The fine is such that f(x) = 0 for x ≤ P
L (where P
L is the 
maximum amount of pollution allowed by law) and f(x) > 0 for x > P
L. 
The first order condition for the optimal choice of pollution is: 
( ) π ϕ x
P
x x f C B + =         (2) 
This condition simply states that the optimal level of pollution for the polluter is that where 
the marginal benefit (LHS) equals the marginal cost (RHS), which is made up of the private 
marginal cost of polluting plus the expected fine.  
                                                              




x xx x f C C B B  
12 It is assumed that there is no strategic behavior by the polluter to affect the level of enforcement by the 
regulator. She simply observes the effort level of the regulator and chooses the optimal level of pollution 
taking the regulator’s actions as given. 11 
 





















The optimal choice of pollution is shown in the upper quadrant of Figure 1. If there 
were  no  regulation  the  polluter  would  chose  the  level  of  pollution  at  the  point  where
P MgCost MgBenefit 0 = . In order to achieve compliance with the law, that allows a maximum 
of  P
L  units  of  pollution,  the  regulator  would  need  to  impose  a  fine  schedule  such  that 
( ) π ϕ x
P f MgCost MgBenefit + = 0 .  One  such  schedule  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1  by  the 
difference
P P MgCost MgCost 0 2 − . When an optimal fine schedule is in place, the polluter will 
choose x2 units of pollution, which is the maximum amount allowed by law. 
  The Regulator’s Problem 
It is assumed that the regulator’s objective is to actually enforce the law, so that his 
utility is maximized when x ≤ P
L. For x > P
L the regulator’s utility decreases with each 
additional  unit  of  pollution,  according  to  the  following  quadratic  utility  function, 
( ) ( )
2 L P x − − π α . The effort π, placed by the regulator to enforce the law, is costly so  ( ) ( ) π x C
R  
must be subtracted from the initial utility.
13 The regulator’s problem is thus: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) π π α
π x C P x




  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) π ϕ y f y C y B x
P
y − − = max arg         (3) 
This  formulation  states  that  the  regulator  will  chose  π  so  as  to  increase  the 
probability that the pollution will be detected and punished, thus leading the polluter to 
optimally reduce x in accordance to her problem in (1). This effort by the regulator yields a 
benefit  by  reducing  pollution,  but  is  costly.  The  equilibrium  condition  for  (3)  to  be 
maximized is: 
  ( ) ( )
R
x
L C P x = − − π α 2                 (4) 
This condition comes from the fact that by choosing π the regulator is indirectly 
choosing x.
14 In equilibrium the marginal cost of increasing enforcement effort (RHS) must 
equal the marginal benefit (LHS). The regulator’s problem can be seen in the lower quadrant 
of Figure 1. Utility is measured increasing vertically with a maximum point at 0. The U
R 
downward sloping curve for levels of pollution greater than x1 shows the decreasing utility to 
                                                              




x P x for x and P x for x C C ≤ = > < < < π π  














π  for fxx ≥0 or sufficiently small. 12 
 
the  regulator  as  pollution  increases.  With  no  regulation  the  polluter  chooses  x0  units  of 
pollution and the regulator’s utility is at b. With an optimal fine, such that the marginal cost 
of polluting becomes 
P MgC2 , the polluter chooses to pollute at x2 and the regulator’s utility 
is at a, its highest possible level. In order to understand the regulator’s choice of π start at a 
situation where no regulation is being realized and consider a marginal increase in π such 
that pollution decreases from x0 to x1. This brings the regulator’s utility up along U
R from 
point b to point c (remember that it is the vertical distance that matters). However there is 
also a cost of increasing enforcement effort, which is represented by the downward shift of 
U
R  to  U
R  –  C
R(·)  that  bring  the  regulator’s  utility  down  from  c to  d.  The  net  effect of 
increasing enforcement so as to reduce pollution form x0 to x1 in Figure 1 is to move utility 
up from b to d. The regulator will continue to increase π marginally, and thus decrease x, 
until the net effect is zero and (4) holds, at which point the optimal amount of enforcement 
effort will have been reached. 
The actual equilibrium reached will depend on the regulator’s cost function. If the 
costs  of  regulation  are  very  high,  any  attempt  to  increase  π  will  yield  more  costs  than 
benefits and the locus of utilities would be decreasing throughout the range from x0 to x2. In 
this  case  the  highest  attainable  utility  would  be  with  pollution  at  x0,  which  would  be 
achieved by simply placing no effort in enforcing the law. If the costs of regulating are very 
low, an upward sloping locus from x0 to x2 will result, yielding full compliance with the law. 
Finally, if the costs of regulating are moderate, at least for the initial units of effort, an 
interior solution such as x1 would result. 
These  results  provide  testable  hypotheses  as  to  which  type  of  environmental 
‘regulator’ will be most effective; an environmental regulatory agency, an NGO, private 
enforcers, public prosecutors, etc. By looking at the structure and process of each regulator - 
that is their design, governance and the institutions which constrain them - their cost of 
regulating can be inferred and conclusions reached about their potential effectiveness.  
  5.2. The Regulator’s Problem with a Third Party Enforcing Enforcement 
Assume now that there is a third party, such as a different governmental agency, an 
NGO, private enforcers or public prosecutors, that can impose a cost on the regulator for not 
bringing pollution down to levels specified in the law. These costs may be imposed by, for 
example, taking the regulator to court or exposing him in the press. This adds a term to the 
regulator’s objective function that penalizes him for not enforcing the law;  ( ) ( ) γ π , x C
RNE , 
where γ is the level of effort of the third party in enforcing enforcement.
15 Initially this 
variable will be taken as given, but will subsequently be derived endogenously from the 
enforcement enforcer’s problem below. The regulator’s problem is now: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) γ π π π α
π , max
2
x C x C P x
RNE RE L − − − −  
subject to 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) π ϕ y f y C y B x
P
y − − = max arg         (5) 
  This yields the following first order condition: 





L C C P x = − − − π α 2           (6) 
This is similar to (4), except that there is now an additional term on the marginal 
benefit side. It is now the case that increasing regulatory effort not only brings pollution 
down, which benefits the regulator directly, but also reduces C
RNE, the cost imposed on the 
regulator for non-performance. In equilibrium both of these marginal benefits must equal the 
marginal cost of regulating, 
R
x C .  
                                                              
15 C
RE now denotes the cost to the regulator of enforcing the law and C
RNE the cost of not enforcing the 
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The regulator’s choice process is shown in Figure 2. Without any effort at regulation 
the  regulator  has  no  C
RE  and  pollution  is  set at  x0  by  the  polluter.  But  the  regulator  is 
penalized by the third party with a cost of C
RNE, which lowers his utility from b to c. If the 
regulator increases π marginally, pollution is reduced to x1. This not only increases utility 
directly, but also reduces the cost of not enforcing bringing the regulator’s utility up to point 
d. But the increase in π also entails a cost through C
RE, which brings utility down to e. As 
drawn in Figure 2 the net effect on the regulator’s utility of the increase in π that reduced 
pollution from x0 to x1 was positive, as e is higher vertically than c. The regulator will thus 
consider increasing π further until the net effect is zero and the equilibrium level of pollution 
has been reached. As before the actual equilibrium will depend on the regulator’s costs of 
enforcing and of not enforcing, the net effect of which will determine a solution.  
The parameter γ measures the level of effort placed by a third party to enforce the 
enforcement activities of the regulator. Comparative static results show that an increase in γ 




















γ  The final step of the analysis is 
thus to ask how the third party chooses how much effort to put  towards pressuring the 
regulator, given the fact that its choice of γ leads to more effort by the regulator and hence 
less pollution. 
  5.3. The Enforcement Enforcer’s Problem 
Assume  that  the  enforcement  enforcer’s  utility  is  maximized  when  the  law  is 
respected and pollution is such that x=P
L.
16 His utility is  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 L P x − − γ π β , excluding the cost 
of  effort,  which  is  similar  to  that  of  the  regulator  except  for  the  preference  intensity 
parameter β which measures how sensitive his utility is to a change in pollution (the greater 
the parameter the higher the sensibility). The choice variable is γ, which is the level of effort 
to enforce the enforcement of the regulator, which also creates a cost  ( ) ( ) γ π x C
EE( . The 
enforcement enforcer’s problem is thus: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) γ π γ π β
γ x C P x
EE L ( max
2
− − −  
subject to 
                                                              
16 Setting the enforcement enforcer’s preferred pollution more or less stringent than the law does not 
change the analysis as what matters is the preference intensity parameter β. 14 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) γ λ λ λ α π
λ , max arg
2
x C x C P x
RNE RE L − − − − =  
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) π ϕ y f y C y B x
P
y
− − = max arg       (7) 
  This  formulation  recognizes  that  the  enforcement  enforcer’s  effect  on  pollution  works 
through his ability to affect the regulator’s actions, who in turn pressures the polluter through 
the fine. Thus an equilibrium must be a triplet (x, π, γ) that simultaneously satisfies all 
elements of (7). The first order condition for this problem is: 
( ) ( ) ( )
EE
x
L C P x = − − γ π β 2             (8) 
which states that the enforcement enforcer will put pressure on the regulator up to the 
point where the marginal benefit of doing so (RHS) equals the marginal cost of that effort 
(LHS). 

























Figure 3 illustrates the enforcement enforcer’s problem. His utility curve U
EE, for 
x>P
L, is drawn with a greater slope than that of the regulator, that is β>α.
17 Starting at the 
point where  the  regulator is  expending no effort, that is π=0, pollution  is at x0 and the 
enforcement  enforcer’s  utility  is  at  point  i.  If  he  marginally  increases  pressure  on  the 
regulator  by  increasing  γ,  pollution  decreases  to  x1  and  his  utility  increases  to  point  ii. 
However, the associated cost of effort lowers his utility to point iii. Because iii is higher than 
i, the net effect was positive and the enforcement enforcer will have the incentive to increase 
γ further. This brings pollution down to x2, which has an effect of increasing utility to point 
iv  (marginal  benefit)  but  decreasing  it  to  v  (marginal  cost).  This  time  the  net  effect  is 
negative as v is lower than iii. Thus the enforcement enforcer will choose to leave γ at the 
previous level, where x1 units of pollution were realized. For this to be an equilibrium it is 
necessary that, simultaneously, the choice of π
* by the regulator that is compatible with 
*
1 x be 
the choice that maximizes his utility, and the choice of 
*
1 x by the polluter be that which 
maximizes her utility given the expected fine associated with π
*. In Figure 3 these conditions 
are met, as  ( )
* *
1 π x  maximizes the regulator’s utility (at point c in the regulator’s locus of 
utilities given γ
*) and  ( )
* *
1 π x  is the point where  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * *
1 π ϕ π x f MgC MgB
P + = . 
                                                              
17 This greater slope does not tell us anything about their relative utilities as one cannot make 
interpersonal utility comparisons. 15 
 
In the next section it will be of interest to know what happens to this equilibrium 
when there is a change in two parameters. The first is the enforcement enforcer’s preference 
intensity, β, which measures how much he cares about pollution levels. The second is a new 
parameter ω now added to his cost function ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ω γ π , x C
EE ), which measures personal or 
institutional characteristics of a given enforcement enforcer that provide greater or smaller 
ability pressure the regulator.
18 Comparative statics on (8) show that: 





















    for x>P
L      (9) 
and 

















ω             (10) 
  Result (9) states that the greater the enforcement enforcer’s preference for achieving low 
pollution the more effort that will be expended in pressuring the regulator. Result (10) shows 
that an enforcement enforcer that has better access to resources, staff and policy instruments 
(that  is,  lower  ω),  will  expend  more  effort  to  compel  the  regulator  to  uphold  the 
environmental law. This paper sustains that of all the potential enforcement enforcers in 
Brazil, public prosecutors have the characteristics to be the most effective. 
 
6. Measuring the Impact of Public Prosecutors 
The claim in this paper is that the existence of public prosecutors, endowed with the 
motivations and powers described in the previous sections profoundly affects the shape and 
impact  of  environmental  policy  in  Brazil.  This  section  presents  statistical  analysis  that 
supports this claim.  
Given their omnipresence there is a natural tendency to presume that the impact of 
public prosecutors in Brazil would be positive and sizeable. Because they are ubiquitous and 
are systematically restricting the behavior of  other  actors, be they  polluters or negligent 
enforcers,  it  seems  straightforward  that  a  positive  impact  on  the  environment  naturally 
follows. Yet there are several reasons why one cannot simply infer that public prosecutors 
are pivotal from their universal presence and high level of activity, thus the usefulness of a 
closer look at the data through an econometric exercise. Before describing the test I list three 
difficulties in trying to measure the impact of the prosecutors as caveats that must be kept in 
mind when interpreting the results.
19 
The first problem is related to the scale of their intervention relative to the size of the 
problem to be addressed. Even if public prosecutors are effective where they are present, it 
may be the case that the magnitude of environmental problems in Brazil are so large that the 
prosecutors, despite their efforts, are not able to significantly improve the overall situation, 
rather only to address selected issues here and there in a dispersed manner. Testing whether 
or  not  this  is  the  case  would  require  having  a  measure  of  the  aggregate  environmental 
situation and its evolution over time.  
A second difficulty with ascertaining the true impact of the public prosecutors is that 
although they may be addressing several important issues effectively at the individual level, 
it  may  be  that  the  lack  of  coordination  across  prosecutors,  as  well  as  with  other 
organizations,  undermines  the  overall  impact,  given  the  many  interdependencies  among 
                                                              
18 A higher ω represents greater impediments for the enforcement enforcer to influence the regulator, so 
0 0 < >
EE
x
EE C and C ω ω . These costs can be related to budgetary issues, political control by other 
governmental actors, availability of policy instruments, staff capacity, etc. 
19 Similar weaknesses in the Ministério Público´s ability to address environmental problems are also 
brought up by McAllister (2008a: 11-14). 16 
 
environmental  factors  as  well  as  the  linkages  among  the  required  solutions  (McAllister 
2008a: 115). 
A third problem of gauging the public prosecutors’ true impact is the fact that all 
policy areas are interlinked through the budget, so that when the Ministério Público forces a 
governmental agency to address an issue that was not being given the proper attention, this 
solve that problem at the cost of some other policy issue over which the prosecutors have 
less  concern,  and  will  now  be  left  uncovered.  When  this  happens  the  prosecutors  are 
essentially taking on the role of policymakers and there is no guarantee that the new mix of 
policies that will emerge is better in terms of social welfare than the previous status quo.
20 
As a first attempt at testing the impact of public prosecutors, I regress a measure of 
environmental quality at the state level against a measure of the strength of the prosecutors in 
that state, plus a series of controls.
21 This approach addresses the scale and coordination 
problems discussed above but not that of the general equilibrium of policies. The idea is to 
test whether, everything else constant, states with more active Ministério Públicos have a 
higher  perception  of  environmental  quality.  The  dependent  variable  is  an  index  of 
environmental quality constructed with data from IBGE (2005), which surveyed all Brazilian 
counties for the existence of environmental problems and the governmental structures in 
place to deal with those problems.
22 The index of environmental quality was constructed 
considering the perception of the presence of 19 different forms of environmental problems 
in  each  county  averaged  out  to  the  state  level.  The  environmental  problems  include 
contamination of the water supply, contamination of the soil, deforestation, air pollution, 
noise pollution, open air sewers, water scarcity, fish scarcity, erosion, among others. The 
index for each state was created from data for all the different counties (municipios) in the 
state. There are 5,555 counties in all and for each county there are 19 different pollutants or 
environmental  problems. The index is thus created from 105,545 data points.
23  The key 
independent variable is an index of the strength of public prosecutors in each state. This 
variable is constructed using data from Sadek and Lima (2006) using principal component 
analysis on the following six variables: (i) Ministério Público expenditures per resident; (ii) 
MP expenditures as a share of total state expenditures; (iii) MP staff per 100,000 residents; 
(iv) percent of  seats for  prosecutors that  are not vacant; (iv)  number  of prosecutors  per 
100,000 residents; (v) number of Civil Action Suits in 2004.
24 The result is an index that 
ranges from zero to one with a higher value denoting a stronger presence of the prosecutors 
in that state. 
In  order  to  address  the  omitted  variable  problem  an  index  of  the  strength  of 
environmental regulation was added as an independent variable. This index was created with 
the IBGE (2005) county data on the existence of governmental structure for dealing with 
                                                              
20 An additional difficulty with ascertaining the impact of public prosecutors is that many of their actions 
must ultimately go through the judiciary where they are frequently struck down. On the other hand, the 
mere existence of the public prosecutors poses a significant deterrent effect so that their overall impact is 
larger than the sum of cases in which they are involved. 
21 Ideally this exercise would be performed at county level, but this is not currently possible due to 
limitations on the availability of data on the public prosecutors. The main drawback is the small number 
of observations. 
22 The surveys were answered by the mayor’s office in each county. 
23 The index for each state was created by dividing the total number of problems found in each county by 
the number of counties in the state, multiplied by 19 (the number of possible problems), that is, Index of 
Env. Quality =  1/(No. of env. problems / (No. of counties * 19)). It can thus be thought of as the average 
probability of a county in the state having a given environmental problem. The 26 states varied from 2.30 
to 24.67. 
24 Sadek and Lima (2006) was a government sponsored ‘census’ of the Ministério Público. The index is 
normalized to the 0 – 1 interval by the formula (xi-Min(x))/(Max(x)-Min(x)), where x is the vector 
obtained from the principal component analysis. 17 
 
environmental  problems.
25  The  idea  is  to  control  for  the  states’  ability  to  address 
environmental  issues  through  regular  environmental  regulation  and  see  if  the  public 
prosecutors have an additional effect. The states’ regulatory capability should be correlated 
with a series of other capabilities and characteristics thus attenuating the omitted variable 
problem. In addition controls are added for the GDP per capita, population density and level 
of education. These controls are highly correlated with several other state characteristics that 
could have an impact on environmental quality that are left out due to the small sample size 
and to avoid multicollinearity.
26 A squared term is added for GDP per capita to allow for a 
non-linear effect indicating an environmental Kuznets curve in which environmental quality 
first declines with economic development but after a certain point starts to increase with 
higher levels of income (Grossman and Krueger 1995). 
The results are presented in Table 1 and descriptive statistics for all variables are 
presented in the appendix. Clearly there is the potential for a simultaneous causality between 
environmental  quality  and  both  public  prosecutors  and  environmental  regulation.  It  is 
possible that states that have lower environmental quality may be more (or less) willing to 
invest in regulation or in public prosecutors. If this is the case the use of ordinary least 
squares would yield inconsistent results. Therefore the regression is performed using both 
ordinary least squares (column 1) and instrumental variables estimation (column 2), which 
will  allow  a  Hausman-Wu  test  to  be  performed  to  determine  whether  there  actually  is 
simultaneity. 
 
  Table 1 – Public Prosecutors and Environmental Quality. 
Dep. Variable: Environmental 
Quality 















































Method  OLS 
Robust Std. Errors 
Instrumental Variable 
Estimation 
Observations  26  26 
R-squared 
Hausman-Wu test 
H0: Pub. Prosecutors and 
Environ. Reg. are exogenous
0.645 
F(2, 17) = 4,95 
p-value = 0.0203 
0.311 
T-stats in parenthesis. 
***= 1%, 
**=5% and 
*=10% level of statistical significance.  
The dependent variable is an index that measures the level of environmental quality in a state based on survey data collected 
from 5,555 counties (IBGE, 2005), see footnotes 18 and 19. All variables in logs. Instruments for column (2) are: i – 
absolute value of latitude of state capital; ii – state’s public revenue in 1928 (Fritscher, 2008); iii – number of counties in the 
state divided by the area (times 1000). 
                                                              
25 This index was created with principal component analysis using the following variables: (i) number of 
counties that have specific environmental structures (EPA, secretariats, etc); (ii) civil servants dedicated 
to regulating the environment; (iii) number of counties that have environmental councils; (iv) number of 
counties that have environmental agreements (with state and federal governments and others); (v) states 
that have specific resources for environmental regulation; (vi) number of counties that have specific laws 
or ordinances for the environment. The index is normalized to the 0 – 1 interval by the formula (xi-
Min(x))/(Max(x)-Min(x)), where x is the vector obtained from the principal component analysis.  
26 The sample size is 26 because the Federal District is left out. The fact that it is a one-county state 
makes it an outlier in the environmental quality index. 18 
 
Three different instruments were used to control for the potential endogeneity of 
public prosecutors and of environmental regulation. To be valid these instruments must be 
correlated to the public prosecutor and environmental indexes, but must have no direct effect 
on the environmental quality variable. The first instrument is the distance of the state capital 
to  the  equator,  following  the  literature  on  the  impact  of  institutions  and  geography  on 
economic growth (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001; McArthur and Sachs 2001). The 
second instrument is the level of public revenues that each state collected in 1928 (Fritscher 
2008). The idea is that there is a correlation between states’ current bureaucratic capabilities 
and early governmental capabilities related to tax collection. Finally, the third instrument is a 
measure of the average size of the counties in a state, which may have an influence on the 
ease of addressing environmental issues for prosecutors and regulators. 
Because  the  Hausman-Wu  test  indicates that we can reject the exogeneity of the 
public prosecutors index and the environmental regulation index I will focus the comments 
of  the  results  on  column  2  in  Table  1.  Starting  with  the  controls  we  see  that  all  three 
variables  are  statistically  significant  and  have  the  expected  sign.  Whereas  education  is 
positively related to environmental quality, population density has the opposite effect. GDP 
per capita has an inverted U relationship with environmental quality, which would seem to 
indicate  the  existence  of  an  environmental  Kuznets  curve.  However,  upon  closer 
examination it turns out that the minimum of the curve is below the smallest observation in 
the sample so that in fact all states are on the upward sloping section of the curve. This 
means  that  as  states  become  richer  they  tend  to  pollute  more.  It  does  not  mean  that 
eventually  an  environmental  Kuznets  curve  dynamic  will  not  take  place  in  Brazil,  with 
increased incomes leading to a higher demand for environmental quality. However, the data 
indicate that such a point has not yet been reached. 
The key result in Table 1 is the positive and statistically significant coefficient for 
public  prosecutors,  which  indicates  that  states with  stronger  and  better  organized  public 
prosecutors will tend to have, ceteris paribus, higher levels of environmental quality. A one 
standard deviation increase in the public prosecutor index leads to an 18% increase in the 
environmental  quality  measure.  This  effect  holds  even  controlling  for  the  strength  of 
environmental regulation, which is also positive and statistically significant. The magnitudes 
of the coefficients indicate a larger impact of regulation than of public prosecutors, however 
a test for the equality of both coefficients accepts that they are statistically equal (p-value of 
0.434). 
Another  possibility  is  that  there  is an interaction  between  public  prosecutors  and 
environmental quality in which the public prosecutors catalyze the environmental regulation 
making it more effective on environmental quality. Such an interaction is consistent with the 
general modis operandi of public prosecutors in the literature (McAllister 2008c). In order to 
test this we included a multiplicative interaction term in the same specification in Table 1. 
The results of the interaction are presented in Figure 4. The full line shows how the impact 
of environmental regulation changes as the public prosecutor index increases from 0 to 1. 
The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval. Because the interval does not contain 
the value 0 in all its range from 0 to 1, the impact of environmental regulation is statistically 
different  from  zero.  At  the  lowest  level  of  the  public  prosecutor  index  the  impact  of 
regulation on environmental quality is approximately 0.61. As the public prosecutor index 
increases, the impact of environmental regulation rises and reaches 0.81 when the public 
prosecutor index is 1. This is evidence that public prosecutors, besides their own direct effect 










Environmental  policy  involves  imposing  restrictions  on  economic  actors.  This 
typically creates upfront costs, while the benefits often materialize only in the distant future. 
In addition, more often than not there are trade-offs between the environment and economic 
growth. This implies that the politically optimal environmental policy is generally much 
different  than  the  socially  optimal.  Politicians,  however,  are  not  unconstrained  in  their 
choices and several forces may push for policies closer to the socially optimal. One of the 
most important is the preference of the electorate, which, even in developing countries, has 
increasingly demanded better environmental quality. However, information asymmetries and 
problems of collective action often blunt the effectiveness of pressure from the electorate so 
that other checks and safeguards are usually also essential. Effective legislation and strong 
environmental  standards  are  necessary,  but  may  be  innocuous  without  the  supporting 
institutions that assure implementation and compliance. Putting in place such institutions is, 
however, not a trivial matter, especially in developing countries where institutions in general 
and checks and balances in particular are typically more frail. A better understanding of 
institutions that support effective environmental policy is a major goal of the literature. 
In this  paper  I have shown  that public prosecutors in  Brazil play a key  role  in 
environmental policy. They are endowed with institutional powers and strong motivations to 
defend diffuse and collective interest such as those related to the environment. In practice 
this  mandate  has  been  exercised  primarily  by  acting  as  a  check  against  omission  and 
incompetence of governments and public bureaucracies. This has been a fundamental factor 
in shaping current de facto environmental policy as I have shown that in Brazil there are 
strong incentives for the government to only truly dedicate resources to this area when fiscal 
targets have been assured. The country has good environmental legislation and strong voter 
preferences for environmental quality, with several important programs in place in every 
environmentally sensitive area. However, the fiscal imperative has meant that this structure 
is often left inert. I have argued that the main force against this natural tendency has been the 
zealous  vigilance  of  the  public  prosecutors.  I  provide  statistical  evidence  that  public 
prosecutors do in fact have a positive impact on environmental quality, even after controlling 
for other intervening factors such as income, education and regular environmental regulation. 
Importantly, the results show that the public prosecutors’ effect is both direct, restricting the 
action of those who use the environment, and indirect, by making the regulatory agencies 
more effective. These results should only be seen as a first step towards understanding the 
role played by public prosecutors in Brazil and the potential for similar arrangements in 
other countries. Although these results show that public prosecutors have a beneficial impact 
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that impact relative to the size of the environmental problems. This may become possible 
once systematic data on the public prosecutors’ actions becomes available and would also 
benefit from the development of better measures of environmental quality. 
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